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Abstract: Web services use tokens provided by the WS-Security standard to 
implement security protocols. We propose several extensions to the WS-Security 
standard, including name types, key and random number extensions. The extensions are 
used to implement existing protocols such as ISO9798, Kerberos or BAN-Lowe. The 
advantages of using these implementations rather than the existing, binary ones, are 
inherited from the advantages of using Web service technologies, such as extensibility 
and end-to-end security across multiple environments that do not support a connection-
based communication. 
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1. Introduction 
Security protocols are “communication protocols dedicated to achieving 
security goals” (C.J.F. Cremers and S. Mauw, 2005) [1] such as confidentiality, 
integrity or availability. Existing technologies such as the Security Assertions 
Markup Language [2] or WS-Security [3] provide a unifying solution for the 
authentication and authorization issues through the use of predefined protocols. 
By implementing these protocols, Web services authenticate users and provide 
authorized access to resources. However, in order to integrate new protocols, 
such as key-exchange or confidentiality protocols, we need to extend the WS-
Security standard with new components. 
In this paper we propose several extensions to the WS-Security standard 
including name types, key and random number extensions. The extensions were 
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used to implement existing protocols such as ISO9798 [4], that makes use of the 
Diffie-Hellman [5] key exchange protocol with digital signatures, or the 
Kerberos V5 [6] symmetric key-based security protocol. The advantages of 
using these implementations rather than the existing, binary ones, are inherited 
from the advantages of using Web service technologies. From these we mention 
extensibility and end-to-end security across multiple environments that do not 
support a connection-based communication. In addition, by adding new tokens 
to the existing ones, message components can be further categorized and 
specialized, providing an increased security of these protocols because of the 
additional information that accompanies each component [9, 10]. 
The implementations were made according to the specifications of the SOAP 
[7] standard, which embodies the WS-Security components in its header. The 
execution timings revealed the possible use of these protocols in a wide variety 
of systems, ranging from e-commerce to multimedia streaming. 
The paper is structured in four parts. After the introduction, section 2 
illustrates the proposed extensions through the form of XML schemas. In 
section 3 we present our experimental results, clearly showing that the proposed 
extensions can be used to implement applications that require authentication, 
key exchange or confidentiality protocols. We end our paper with a conclusion 
and future work in section 4. 
2. WS-Security extensions 
WS-Security provides a set of tokens for implementing security properties 
such as authentication, integrity and non-repudiation [9, 11]. These properties 
are used by Web services to construct security protocols providing inter-domain 
authentication. These are predefined, static protocols that must be implemented 
by all communicating parties. In order to implement other authentication 
protocols or other types of security protocols, the tokens provided by WS-
Security must be extended with several new ones. 
We consulted a large number of security protocols from the SPORE [12]  
library and the library of protocols presented by John Clark [8]. Based on these, 
we identified four basic sets containing terms used by protocol participants to 
construct messages: P, \textsf{N}; N, denoting the set of nonces (i.e. “number 
once used”); K, denoting the set of cryptographic keys and M denoting user-
defined components. 
The set of participant names P is further specialized with the following 
disjoint sets: DN ⊆P P , denoting the set of distinguished names; UD ⊆P P , 
denoting the set of user-domain names; IP ⊆P P , denoting the set of user-IP 
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names; D ⊆P P , denoting the set of domain names; U ⊆P P , denoting the set of 
remaining user name types. 
The set of nonces is also further specialized with two subsets: R ⊆N N , the 
set of random numbers and T ⊆N N , denoting the set of timestamps. 
Based on the above-defined sets and subsets, in the remaining of this section 
we provide the XML representation of the terms corresponding to the 
implementation of each element. The WS-Security standard provides a single 
XML element for defining user names, through the form of 
wsse:UsernameToken. For example, in order to define a user name, the 
following syntax is required: 
<wsse:UsernameToken>Denumire utilizator</wsse:UsernameToken> 
Distinguished names are usually found in user certificates and they provide 
information related to the organization, country, domain and several other 
categories characterizing a user. In order to define user names in this format, we 
define the following XML schema: 
<complexType name="DistinguishedNameToken"> 
     <sequence> 
      <element name="Organization" type="string"/> 
      <element name="OrganizationalUnit" type="string"/> 
      <element name="CommonName" type="string"/> 
      <element name="Country" type="string"/> 
     </sequence> 
</complexType> 
User-domain names have the following structure: user@host.domain or 
user.host.domain. The schema for such a user name must include the user name 
and one or more host or domain names separated by dots. The resulting schema 
is the following: 
<complexType name="UserDomainNameToken"> 
     <sequence> 
      <element name="UserName" type="string"></element> 
      <element name="DomainName"> 
       <simpleType> 
        <restriction base="string"> 
         <pattern value="(\w+\.\w+)+"></pattern> 
        </restriction> 
       </simpleType> 
      </element> 
     </sequence> 
  </complexType> 
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IP addresses and identifying machine names must include support for both 
IPv4 and IPv6 address formats. The resulted XML schema makes use of regular 
expressions to describe the rules for constructing such names: 
<complexType name="UserIPNameToken"> 
    <choice> 
     <element name="IPV4"> 
       <simpleType> 
         <restriction base="string"> 
       <pattern value="\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}"/> 
      </restriction> 
       </simpleType> 
     </element> 
     <element name="IPv6"> 
       <simpleType> 
         <restriction base="string"> 
      <pattern value="([0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){7}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}"/> 
         </restriction> 
       </simpleType> 
     </element> 
    </choice> 
</complexType> 
For names containing exclusive domain names, we use the following 
schema: 
<simpleType name="DomainNameToken"> 
       <restriction base="string"> 
        <pattern value="(\w+\.\w+)+"></pattern> 
       </restriction> 
     </simpleType> 
Random numbers are transmitted as binary tokens, for which a security 
token is already provided by the WS-Standard. Transmitting timestamps is also 
possible by using existing tokens provided by WS-Security. However, in order 
to send and receive encrypted binary keys we use an XML schema that defines 
the key value and the encoding type used: 
  <complexType name="KeyToken"> 
     <sequence> 
      <element name="KeyValue" type="string"/> 
     </sequence> 
     <attribute name="type"> 
      <simpleType> 
        <restriction base="string"> 
       <enumeration value="base64Binary"/> 
       <enumeration value="hexBinary"/> 
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        </restriction> 
      </simpleType> 
     </attribute> 
    </complexType> 
3. Experimental results 
The proposed extensions were used to implement protocols with security 
properties ranging from authentication to key exchange and message 
confidentiality. The protocols were constructed from participants exchanging 
terms. Terms were constructed from the elements belonging to the basic sets 
provided in the previous section: 
                              ( ) { } ( ):: . | | | | | , | FuncName= TT P N K M T T T ,                           (1) 
where FuncName defines the set of function names used to encrypt terms: 
NumeFunc ::= sk          (symmetricencryption)                      (2) 
                | pk          (asymmetric encryption) 
                | h          (hash encryption) 
                | hmac  (keyed hash encryption) 
By using the above definitions, protocol messages can be constructed as in 
the following examples: 
- { } ( ), , , aba sk KA B N K , where ,A B ∈P , aN ∈N , K ∈K ; 
- { }{ } ( ), , ,aa ah pk PKA N A N , where A∈P şi aN ∈N , aPK ∈K .  
 
 
Figure 1:. Symmetric encryption versus no encryption. 
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The implementation of these messages replaces each component with its 
corresponding security token provided by the proposed extensions. The 
performance of the implementations is strongly dependent on the type of 
encryption function used in the process. For example, there is an obvious 
difference between an implementation that uses symmetric encryption and one 
that does not use encryption at all. This is the case illustrated in Fig. 1, where 
the encrypted message is { } ( )absk KM , with M ∈M . The figure illustrates the 
time required to construct, encrypt and send a message using the proposed 
tokens and the already existing ones. 
In our experiments, messages were encoded in the SOAP [7] header, 
according to the WS-Security standard. Because of their size, as seen in Fig. 1, 
the XML structures influence the performance of the implemented protocols. 
This is also influenced by the type of encryption used, as shown in Fig. 2. 
The illustrated values correspond to the execution time for constructed 
messages using symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. The symmetric 
encryption-based protocol is clearly much more performant than the asymmetric 
encryption-based protocol. This is why, the first protocol is usually used for 
data transfer, while the second one for encrypting small sized messages, usually 
in key exchange and authentication protocols. 
 
 
Figure 2:. Symmetric versus asymmetric encryption. 
The experimental results given in Fig.1 and 2 show that the performance of the 
implemented protocols is not only influenced by the size of the encrypted messages, but 
also by the encryption algorithm type. We have implemented several other protocols, 
for which the execution timings are given in table 1. We identified several participants  
for each protocol. We measured the construction and the processing time of messages 
for each participant; the measured values were added together, resulting the total time. 
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We can see a clear difference between protocols that use symmetric algorithms (e.g. 
Lowe-BAN, Kerberos, Andrew RPC) and protocols that use asymmetric algorithms 
(e.g. ISO9798, CCITT X.509). For some protocols, the processing or construction 
timings are 0 because the sub-protocols we identified do not require operations. Based 
on these measurements, we can clearly state that using the proposed WS-Security 
extensions, we can implement key exchange, authentication and user-defined data 
exchange protocols. Implementing such protocols with existing WS-Security tokens is 
possible only for authentication protocols, for which the WS-Trust standard (using WS-
Security) defines several predefined protocols. 
Table 1 : Execution time of security protocols 
Participant role 
Message 
construction 
(ms) 
Message 
processing 
(ms) 
Total 
participant 
(ms) 
Total 
(ms) 
Lowe-BAN Initiator 11.81 3.68 15.49 
Lowe-BAN Respondent 2.86 1.62 4.48 19.97 
ISO9798 Initiator 35.78 23.30 59.08 
ISO9798 Respondent 6.87 12.24 19.11 78.19 
Kerberos 1 Initiator 0.83 0.00 0.83 
Kerberos 2 Initiator 0.55 1.58 2.13 
Kerberos 3 Initiator 3.34 0.94 4.28 
Kerberos 1 Respondent 0.00 0.41 0.41 
Kerberos 2 Respondent 3.37 1.67 5.04 
Kerberos 3 Respondent 11.41 3.59 15 
27.69 
CCITT X.509 Initiator 7.85 0.00 7.85 
CCITT X.509 Respondent 0.00 74.42 74.42 82.27 
Andrew RPC Initiator 12.56 5.04 17.6 
Andrew RPC Respondent 14.04 4.9 18.94 36.54 
4. Conclusions and future work 
Existing tokens from the WS-Security standard provide the possibility for 
implementing a reduced set of security protocols. In order to enable the 
implementation of a wide range protocols, we proposed several token 
extensions for user name types and cryptographic keys. 
The protocol implementations maintain their security properties by 
respecting the requirements given in the WS-Security standard. These 
requirements indicate the use of the SOAP header for transporting security 
tokens and the use of the SOAP body for other message components. The 
implementations we have developed show that protocol performance is 
influenced by the XML constructions and by cryptographic functions used in 
the process. Based on our experimental results, we can clearly state that the proposed 
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extensions offer security for protocols used in various applications, such as multimedia 
or eCommerce. 
In the future we intend to use the proposed extensions to implement several 
security protocols for multimedia applications and to prove that our 
implementations can be used to transfer audio and video messages without loss 
of quality. 
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